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Women’s representation in science has changed substantially, but unevenly, over the
past 40 years. In health and biological sciences, for example, women’s representation
among U.S. scientists is now on par with or greater than men’s, while in physical sciences
and engineering they remain a clear minority. We investigated whether variation in
proportions of women in scientific disciplines is related to differing levels of male-favoring
explicit or implicit stereotypes held by students and scientists in each discipline.
We hypothesized that science-is-male stereotypes would be weaker in disciplines
where women are better represented. This prediction was tested with a sample of
176,935 college-educated participants (70% female), including thousands of engineers,
physicians, and scientists. The prediction was supported for the explicit stereotype,
but not for the implicit stereotype. Implicit stereotype strength did not correspond
with disciplines’ gender ratios, but, rather, correlated with two indicators of disciplines’
scientific intensity, positively for men and negatively for women. From age 18 on, women
who majored or worked in disciplines perceived as more scientific had substantially
weaker science-is-male stereotypes than did men in the same disciplines, with gender
differences larger than 0.8 standard deviations in the most scientifically-perceived
disciplines. Further, particularly for women, differences in the strength of implicit
stereotypes across scientific disciplines corresponded with the strength of scientific
values held by women in the disciplines. These results are discussed in the context of
dual process theory of mental operation and balanced identity theory. The findings point
to the need for longitudinal study of the factors’ affecting development of adults’ and,
especially, children’s implicit gender stereotypes and scientific identity.
Keywords: diversity, gender, science education, science workforce, stereotypes
Introduction
In 1966 just 7% of undergraduate women took their bachelor’s degrees in STEM (Science,
Technology, Engineering, Math, excluding health and social science; National Science
Foundation, National Center for Science and Engineering Statistics, 2011a, Table 9).
More than four decades later, despite passage in 1972 of Title IX of the Civil Rights
Act and an ensuing great expansion of higher education opportunities for women, the
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figure moved only to 10% (National Science Foundation,
National Center for Science and Engineering Statistics, 2011a,
data for 2008). This is slightly down from the high water mark
of 12%, first reached during the mid-1980s and achieved again
in 2000 and 2003. Meanwhile, men’s likelihood of majoring
in STEM disciplines decreased, from 29% in 1966 to 23% in
2008 (National Science Foundation, National Center for Science
and Engineering Statistics, 2011a, Table 7). These trends—slow,
halting progress into STEM for women and declining interest
for men—may explain why leaders in STEM fields are concerned
with recruitment and retention of everyone, regardless of sex, but
also draw attention to the persisting sex difference in pursuit of
STEM-related careers. Even with men’s sagging interest, in 2008
they were still more than twice as likely as women to pursue and
earn an undergraduate STEM degree.
Eliminating the apparent ceiling on women’s STEM interest
has long been a national priority, its causes and possible remedies
the focus of extensive research and debate (e.g., Gallagher and
Kaufman, 2005; Summers, 2005; Ceci and Williams, 2007, 2010,
2011; Halpern et al., 2007; National Academies of Science, 2007).
Increasing attention has been paid to the variation in women’s
representation across different STEM domains (e.g., greater
in biology than in engineering; National Science Foundation,
National Center for Science and Engineering Statistics, 2011a) as
a clue to understanding the causes of their underrepresentation
(Su et al., 2009; Robertson et al., 2010; Cheryan, 2012).
Variation in STEM Gender Ratios
Undergraduate Degrees
Beneath the overall sex difference in STEM pursuit there is
wide variation in STEM gender ratios across disciplines. Figure 1
plots the percentage of women earning the bachelor’s degrees
awarded in various major STEM fields from 1966 to 2008. By
2008 women earned between 44 and 60% of the degrees in
biology, chemistry and mathematics, but only about 20% in
physics, engineering, and computer science (National Science
Foundation, National Center for Science and Engineering
Statistics, 2011a).
FIGURE 1 | Percentage of women earning bachelors degrees awarded
in STEM, 1966–2008 (NSF, 2011a; Tables 5, 7, 9, 28, 33, 34, 37, 38, and
46). Bio, Biology; CS, computer sciences; Phys, Physics; Engin, Engineering.
Occupations
Variation in women’s STEM representation is also apparent
among practicing scientists. In 2006, among employed U.S.
scientists (defined by NSF as anyone in a STEM field with at
least a bachelor’s degree; National Science Foundation, 2011b)
women constituted nearly two-thirds (65%) of those in health
sciences, 50% of those in biological sciences, 27% in physical
sciences (including 33% in chemistry, 21% in earth sciences, and
16% in physics/astronomy), and 13% in engineering. Women
now constitute roughly half of all new physicians (Association
of AmericanMedical Colleges, 2013), but among employed PhD-
level scientists, women comprise just 16% in the physical sciences
and 9% in engineering (National Science Foundation, 2011b).
Thus, in the professional scientific ranks, biological and health
sciences are characterized by relatively high female-male ratios,
at 1:1 or higher, while physical sciences and engineering are
characterized by low female-male ratios, at 0.33:1 or lower.
The Influence of Stereotypes
Recent studies indicate that variability in women’s engagement
across STEM fields reflects patterns of early-developing
childhood interests, and that these interests may be influenced by
stereotypes and by inadequate information about the nature of
opportunities in different scientific domains (Ceci and Williams,
2011; Cheryan, 2012; Eccles, 2007; Kaminski and Geisler, 2012).
Although stereotypes about gender and STEM (e.g., more
naturally the domain of boys and men) are now usually explicitly
disavowed as a rationale for choosing courses to take, majors to
enter, or persons to hire, evidence suggests that they nevertheless
affect perceptions, performance and decisions, primarily without
intention or awareness (e.g., Crowley et al., 2001; Moss-Racusin
et al., 2012; Nosek et al., 2012; Galdi et al., 2014). Stereotypes,
generally defined as associations of an attribute with members
of a group, can operate at an “explicit” level, i.e., conscious
perceptions of, or beliefs about, group-attribute covariation,
and also at an “implicit” level, as automatic, possibly unwanted,
group-attribute associations that operate outside of conscious
awareness (Greenwald and Banaji, 1995; Lee et al., 1995;
Gawronski and Bodenhausen, 2006; Nosek et al., 2012).
A naturalistic observational study of families at science
museums seems to illustrate the independence of explicit and
implicit gender–science stereotypes. Crowley et al. (2001) found
that parents who brought their children to science museum
exhibits spontaneously offered more explanations of phenomena
to their sons than to their daughters. Here were parents that,
ostensibly, were working to expose both their girls and boys
to science, yet, unknowingly, were engaging more, teaching
more, with the boys. If asked, these parents would doubtless
say (and believe)—explicitly—that they are equally committed to
the best possible science education for their child of either sex;
that’s why they were visiting the science museum! But Crowley
et al.’s observations of many families belie differential treatment
according to sex of the children, an implicit bias impossible for
any of these parents to observe on their own. Such unconscious
sex-differentiated patterns in adults’ interaction with children in
the science domain are the sort that Galdi et al. (2014) speculated
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may spur the early development of girls’ implicit math–gender
stereotypes, which they found operating for six-year-olds prior
to the emergence of explicit stereotyping. Galdi et al. (2014)
experimentally exposed six-year-old boys and girls to either
stereotype-congruent or incongruent images of children and
math accomplishment and observed corresponding influence
on the girls’, but not the boys’, implicit math(language)–gender
stereotypes. The induced implicit stereotyping differences, in
turn, were found to mediate stereotype-consistent effects on
the girls’ math performance, while there were no effects of
explicit endorsement of math–gender stereotypes. If parents’
and teachers’ unconscious behaviors systematically suggest that
certain STEM disciplines are more fitting for one sex than the
other, the effect on children’s implicit stereotypes, accumulating
from a very young age, may differentially influence interest,
accomplishment and persistence in particular sciences.
Relations between Gender Ratios and
Stereotypes
Our data allowed investigation of whether variation in female
representation across scientific disciplines is associated with
differences in the strength of gender–science stereotypes, explicit
and implicit, held by men and women in these fields. Current
theory and evidence suggests that both explicit and implicit
gender–science stereotypes should change as conditions in
local environments change, including gender ratios. In perhaps
the most relevant work supporting this idea, Miller et al.
(in press), using the same stereotype measures we will analyze,
found that average explicit and implicit stereotypes across 66
countries correlated negatively with countries’ female proportion
of college science majors; that is, higher proportions of women in
collegiate science predicted weaker country-level science-is-male
stereotyping.
Gawronski and Bodenhausen (2006), in their associative-
propositional evaluation (APE) model, argue that explicit
evaluations, such as stereotypes, ultimately depend on weighing
the truth and importance of propositions that come to mind, e.g.,
“When I look around in my physics class I see mostly men.” or
“I’m a woman doing very well in physics.” When answering a
question about degree of association between science and gender,
if women in physics take stock of gender ratios, they will see, on
average, fewer women than will be seen by women in biology.
Thus, other factors being equal, physics women should explicitly
report a stronger science-is-male association than should biology
women. This is consistent with Eagly and colleagues’ social role
theory (Eagly and Steffens, 1984; Eagly et al., 2000) which posits
that varying distributions of men and women in certain activities
and occupations drive explicit stereotyping and promote a cycle
of corresponding skill and interest development. Consistent
with such a cycle, Inzlicht and Ben-Zeev (2000), studying a
sample of students from a highly selective private university
(though not from any particular academic major) experimentally
demonstrated a connection between gender ratios, stereotypes
and academic performance. They found that women’s math,
but not verbal, test scores suffered as a function of increased
proportion of men in the immediate enviroment. Diekman
and Eagly (2000) demonstrated that explicit stereotypes are
responsive to changes in women’s representation; if gender
distributions change, explicit stereotypes follow suit.
Implicit stereotyping, too, should vary with gender ratios.
Ratliff and Nosek (2010) demonstrated that implicit associations
quickly form in accord with environmental stimuli. Gawronski
and Bodenhausen’s (2006) APE model specifies that change in
implicit evaluation will follow from either a changed structure
of mental associations (actual strengthening of the associative
link between a group and an attribute) or from the differential
activation of existing structures (e.g., science–male associations
may be more likely to be activated if one is routinely surrounded
by men in a scientific context). Thus, for both men and women
studying or working in scientific environments with higher male-
to-female ratios, we can expect either route to result, on average,
in stronger implicit science-is-male stereotyping. Miller et al.
(in press), found that the negative country-level relation between
female proportion of science majors and implicit science-is-male
stereotyping was stronger for participants with college experience
than for those without, suggesting that greater associative
exposure to particular collegiate gender–science ratios may be the
difference.
Results of studies of change of implicit stereotypes as a
function of gender representation in the environment, however,
are mixed. Stout et al. (2011) found no change in the math–
gender stereotype evidenced by female calculus students as a
function of the sex of their professor, even though strong positive
change was observed for these women’s implicit math attitude
and identity. Consequently, Dasgupta (2011) argues that implicit
STEM–gender stereotypes are rather intractable, but that their
effects can be neutralized to the extent that implicit STEM
identity is strong, and that the latter strengthens with increased
exposure to female faculty and competent STEM peers. Smyth
and colleagues (Martin et al., 2013; Smyth unpublished data),
studying the math–gender stereotypes of students in university
differential equations courses with female professors, found that
implicit stereotype change depended on the sex of the student.
Women’s stereotypes, relatively weak to begin with, did not
change, but men evidenced statistically significant weakening of
their initially strong stereotype. Perhaps the strongest evidence
for implicit stereotype change as a function of gender ratios
in the local environment comes from change in a leadership-
is-male stereotype (Dasgupta and Asgari, 2004). The strength
of women’s stereotypes changed across the first year of college
depending on their degree of contact with female faculty,
weakening with greater contact. Their results imply, Dasgupta
and Asgari concluded, that increased female representation in
local environments in previously male-dominated fields can,
even in the short space of a year, “. . . have a powerful impact on
stereotype change” (p. 654).
Greenwald and colleagues’ balanced identity theory (BIT) of
implicit social cognition (Greenwald et al., 2002) is grounded
in principles of cognitive consistency and balanced identity
(Heider, 1958). BIT anticipates that change in any one of these
three sets of associations—group identity (e.g., self–female),
attribute identity (e.g., self–math), or stereotype (e.g., math–
male)—will induce balancing change in at least one of the others.
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Thus, if women’s self-identification strengthens with the male-
stereotyped field of math, as found by Stout et al. (2011), BIT
predicts weakening of either their implicit female gender identity
or their implicit math-is-male stereotype, or both, to maintain
congruence or cognitive balance among the associations. If
girls’ and women’s science identity is strengthened by increased
opportunity to interact with female peers and mentors in
scientific endeavors (as suggested by Dasgupta, 2011), then
according to BIT we should find weaker science-is-male implicit
stereotypes among women in high female-male ratio science
fields than among those in low female-male ratio science fields.
In other words, if their self–science associations strengthen, and
their self–female associations hold constant, then their counter-
stereotypical female–science associations will strengthen—and
their stereotypical male–science associations will weaken.
There is abundant evidence that implicit STEM–gender
stereotypes are not monolithic, but vary predictably with interest,
persistence, and performance in math and science (Nosek et al.,
2002a; Kiefer and Sekaquaptewa, 2007; Nosek and Smyth, 2011;
Lane et al., 2012). As predicted by BIT, men and women
who identify with science differ substantially in the strength
of their implicit gender stereotypes about science and math
(Nosek et al., 2002a; Nosek and Smyth, 2011; Lane et al.,
2012). For men, stronger science self-concepts are associated
with stronger implicit science-is-male bias, while for women
stronger science self-concepts coincide with weaker implicit
science-is-male bias. Nosek and Smyth (2011), studying data
from other online volunteers, found a trend of weaker implicit
math-is-male stereotyping for both men and women who
pursued graduate work in STEM compared to those with
only undergraduate training (between 0.1 and 0.2 standard
deviations weaker). The much larger current data set, which
includes more detailed reports of degree-level and specifications
of different STEM disciplines, allows testing of “dosage” effects
within particular fields. Does prolonged exposure to a particular
gender-ratio correlate with stereotype strength differences within
given fields? That is, do scientists in low-female fields evidence
stronger science-is-male stereotypes, and scientists in high-
female fields evidence weaker ones, the longer they practice in
that field?
Hypotheses about Variation in the Strength
of Science-is-male Stereotyping
1. Stereotype differences between female and male scientists:
(a) Implicit: Women who are strongly identified with science
will have relatively weak implicit stereotypes, while men
who are strongly science-identified will have relatively
strong ones. This pattern, already well-established in the
literature based on broad classifications like STEM vs.
not-STEM, should yield large sex differences in implicit
stereotyping among the scientists of our sample. Our data,
which includes more detailed distinctions of academic
major and profession than collected in other studies of
implicit stereotyping in STEM, allows a more fine-grained
replication of this well-established pattern.
(b) Explicit: The same pattern of sex difference will
hold for scientists’ explicit stereotyping, weaker for
women, stronger for men, if only because self–science
propositions that may come to mind will differ (“I’m
successful in science and a woman.” vs. “I’m successful
in science and a man.”). However, owing to conscious
endorsement of egalitarian values and social approbation
against stereotyping, we expected the explicit stereotyping
gender gap to be smaller than for implicit stereotypes.
2. Stereotype differences as a function of gender ratios in science
environments:
(a) Implicit: Science-is-male stereotypes will be stronger for
both women and men in low-female STEM fields than in
high-female fields, though sex differences should remain.
For example, women in physics (low-female) should
evidence stronger implicit science-is-male stereotyping
than women in biology (high-female). The pattern for men
in these majors should be similar, even if the means are
higher than women’s.
(b) Explicit stereotypes will also reflect gender ratios (stronger
stereotypic associations reported in low-female than in
high-female science disciplines). Again, however, group
variation on explicit stereotype means should be somewhat
constrained by conscious values and motivations to
respond without bias.
3. Stereotype differences as a function of “dosage” of exposure to
given gender-ratios:
(a) Implicit: Prolonged exposure to STEM environments
characterized by particular gender ratios will strengthen
the corresponding implicit stereotype. That is, prolonged
exposure to low-female environments should strengthen
science-is-male stereotyping, while prolonged exposure
to high-female environments should weaken it. This
hypothesis derives from theory and empirical findings
concerning the formation of new implicit associations,
and some cross-sectional data that are consistent with
dosage effects. Nosek and Smyth (2011) found a slight
diminution of stereotyping for both men and women
reporting graduate study in STEM, compared to those with
only undergraduate study, and Miller et al. (in press) found
a college vs. no-college effect on stereotyping as a function
of collegiate gender ratios in STEM, generally. Neither
of these analyses distinguished between types of STEM
fields. In the current data, we expect increasing stereotype-
strength from age 18 to age 22 among science-declared
college students in low-female fields, and a declining trend
in high-female fields. Similar patterns should be found
across increasing levels of training (e.g., from BS to MA
to PhD).
(b) Explicit stereotypes, when measured for scientists in a
given field with roughly constant gender-ratio, will not
be systematically responsive to dosage because the general
propositions being consciously weighed may not change
very much. That is, whether for an undergraduate woman
majoring in physics or a female professor of physics, the
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propositions to weigh will likely involve, on average (1)
the fact of the majority-male field and (2) assessments
of personal, or other women’s, accomplishments. If
noteworthy scientific accomplishments by women come to
mind easier for women who have been in the field longer,
wemight expect a diminution of the explicit stereotype. But
if the intractability of the gender-ratio in the field is more
salient for these women, their stereotype self-reports might
strengthen. To the extent that these different framings are
idiosyncratically applied by individuals, systematic change
across cohorts would seem unlikely.
Study Overview
We tested these predictions with over 176,000 visitors to a
publicly accessible educational website (https://implicit.harvard.
edu/) who reported U.S. citizenship, at least some college
experience and an academic major. Explicit “science-is-male”
stereotyping was defined simply as verbally associating the term
“science” more with “male” than with “female,” and implicit
stereotyping by performance on an Implicit Association Test,
fully described in the methods section. Our data are cross-
sectional, so differences across age or level of training can only
be considered suggestive of change. A particular strength of our
sample is inclusion of thousands of STEM majors, whereas most
other research on implicit STEM associations has been conducted
with small samples.
A public website, known as Project Implicit, was launched
in September 1998 with the purpose of heightening public
awareness of implicit social cognition, and alerting participants to
the possibility that mental associations outside of their awareness
or control might differ from their consciously held attitudes
(Nosek et al., 2002b, 2007). Visitors to the site may choose
from a variety of Implicit Association Tests (IATs; Greenwald
et al., 1998) and “Gender–science” has been a long-standing
and popular topic (for summary of the topics and data, see
Nosek et al., 2007). Though the sample is not representative of
a definable population other than that of visitors to the Project
Implicit site, it reflects greater age and education variation than
the samples of college students that characterize much research.
Study protocol was reviewed and authorized by the University
of Virginia Institutional Review Board for Social and Behavioral
Sciences.
Methods
Participants
Our analyses are of 176,935 Project Implicit volunteers from
May 2004 through January 2012 who reported U.S. citizenship,
their sex, at least some college experience, an academic major,
and completed the implicit and explicit academic stereotype
measures. Seventy percent of participants were female, and
racial identifications, in order of proportion, were White,
81.1%; Black, 5.5%; More than one race, 5.1%; Other or
unknown, 3.1%; East Asian, 2.6%; South Asian, 1.5%; American
Indian/Alaska Native, 0.6%; Native Hawaiian/Pacific Islander,
0.5%. An Hispanic ethnicity was reported by 6.7%, not-Hispanic
by 89.3%, and unknown ethnicity by 4.0%1. The median age
was 25 (M = 29, SD = 12, range 17–90), and 59% were
older than the typical college age range of 17–22. Fifty-one
percent of participants reported some college experience short of
a bachelor’s degree (most of these were aged 18–22), 30% reported
a bachelor’s degree as their highest level, and 19% reported a
graduate degree.
Explicit Science Identity: Academic Major
Participants could select from the following list of 13 categories
of majors to indicate their “Major field of study or that of your
highest degree.” Underlined categories were coded as STEM
majors in our analyses.
Biological sciences/life sciences
Business
Communications
Computer and information sciences
Education
Engineering, mathematics, or physical sciences/science
technologies
Health professions or related sciences
Humanities/liberal arts
Law or legal studies
Psychology
Social sciences or history
Visual or performing arts
Other
Following other researchers in the STEM achievement literature
(e.g., Elliott et al., 1995; Xie and Shauman, 2003; Smyth
and McArdle, 2004; Tai et al., 2006), we defined STEM
majors as those in biological, physical, computer, or health2
sciences (those choosing the “Other” option, about 6% of
respondents, were excluded from analyses). For the purpose
of displaying the dozen categories of majors in Figure 2A
through Figure 4B, from least to most science-intensive, we
asked 19 psychology graduate students who were blind to our
hypotheses and analytic plan to rank the categories in order
of their perception of the amount of scientific course work
required (Cronbach’s α = 0.985; see Supplementary Materials
for details).
Explicit Science Identity: Scientific Profession
A question about occupation was added to the Project
Implicit survey in December 2006. Our analyses focus on
comparisons between respondents who identified, by both
occupation and corresponding education level, as engineers,
1Race and ethnicity proportions are based on participants since December 2006
(N = 106, 515, or 60% of the sample) when new U.S. Office of Management and
Budget reporting formats were adopted in the study. Racial/ethnic classification
of earlier participants can be observed in the raw data available at https://osf.io/
y7a3n/
2Note that some of our illustrative STEM statistics in the Introduction did not
include Health sciences. Precise definitions of STEM vary, sometimes defined
narrowly as natural science, technology, engineering, and mathematics fields,
excluding Health and Social Sciences, and sometimes including all of these.
Consistent with many researchers, our empirical analyses treat the health sciences
as a STEM field.
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FIGURE 2 | Continued
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FIGURE 2 | (A) Mean implicit science = male IAT score (+/− 1 se) by sex
and major field. Majors are ordered, left to right, by ratings of science content
(method described in Supplementary Material). A score of zero indicates no
academic gender bias. (B) Mean explicit science = male score (+/− 1 se) by
sex and major field. Majors are ordered, left to right, by ratings of science
content (method described in Supplementary Material). A score of zero
indicates no academic gender bias. (C) Mean explicit arts = female score
(+/− 1 se) by sex and major field. Majors are ordered, left to right, by ratings
of science content (method described in Supplementary Material). A score of
zero indicates no academic gender bias.
FIGURE 3 | (A) Mean implicit science = male IAT score (+/− 1 se) for
women ages 18–22 by age and major field. Majors are ordered, left to
right, by ratings of science content (method described in Supplementary
Material). A score of zero indicates no academic gender bias. (B) Mean
implicit science = male score (+/− 1 se) for men ages 18–22 by age
and major field. Majors are ordered, left to right, by ratings of science
content (method described in Supplementary Material). A score of zero
indicates no academic gender bias.
physicians, biological scientists, or physical scientists and
reported an age of 26 or older (N = 4593, which
constituted 12% of occupations reported by participants in
that age range). Age 26 was used as a threshold to roughly
control for the youngest typical age of attaining an MD
degree in the U.S. (Association of American Medical Colleges,
2014).
Explicit Science Identity: Importance of being
Personally Knowledgeable about Science
Also added to the survey in December 2006 were questions
about personal knowledge goals in three broad domains, liberal
arts, math, and science. Specifically, each participant was asked
about a random two of the three, as follows: “Rate the following
personal-goal-statements on their importance to you”:
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FIGURE 4 | (A) Mean explicit science = male score (+/− 1 se) for
women ages 18–22 by age and major field. Majors are ordered, left to
right, by ratings of science content (method described in Supplementary
Material). A score of zero indicates no academic gender bias. (B) Mean
explicit science = male score (+/− 1 se) for men ages 18–22 by age
and major field. Majors are ordered, left to right, by ratings of science
content (method described in Supplementary Material). A score of zero
indicates no academic gender bias.
“Being knowledgeable about liberal arts.” “. . . about math.”
“. . . about science.”
The five rating options, with our coding in parentheses, were: Not
at all important (0), Slightly (1), Moderately (2), Very (3), and
Extremely important (4). The science question was answered by
N = 69, 929 participants.
Mapping our Four STEM Academic Major
Categories to Collegiate and Professional STEM
Gender Ratios
Based on our review of NSF data (National Science Foundation,
National Center for Science and Engineering Statistics, 2011a),
we classified as either relatively high-female or low-female the
gender ratios of the four STEM major categories from which our
participants could choose:
High-female:
Biological sciences/life sciences.
Health professions or related sciences.
Low-female:
Computer and information sciences.
Engineering, mathematics, or physical sciences/science
technologies.
The biological and health science fields are classified as high-
female because women have recently constituted half or more
of college graduates and employed scientists, while engineering,
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physical and computer science fields are classified as low-
female because women tend to constitute less than one-
third of undergraduates and scientists in these areas. While
there is considerable variation of gender ratios within the
disciplines of our category Engineering, mathematics, or physical
sciences/science technologies (e.g., considering bachelor’s degrees
awarded in 2008, female proportions were 50% in chemistry, 44%
in mathematics, 40% in earth sciences, 20% in physics, and 19%
in engineering), nearly half of women earning degrees in these
areas are in the particularly low-female ratio fields of engineering
and physics (National Science Foundation, National Center for
Science and Engineering Statistics, 2011a). If the proportions
of women recently graduating in these subfields match the
underlying proportions among our volunteers choosing the
physical sciences category, then a reasonable approximation of
the upper limit for the average percentage of women encountered
by those reporting a physical science major is 32%.
Explicit Academic Gender Stereotypes
Explicit academic gender stereotypes were assessed separately
for both “Liberal Arts” and “Science” by asking participants
to “Please rate how much you associate the following domains
with males or females.” Five response options were provided
on the questionnaire until December of 2006 (strongly male,
somewhat male, neither male nor female, somewhat female,
strongly female) and seven options were provided thereafter
(replacing the “somewhat” options with “moderately” and
“slightly” options). Thus, 40% of participants answered with
a 5-point scale and 60% with a 7-point scale. Regardless of
scale type, a “neither male nor female” response was coded
zero, stereotype-congruent responses were coded with positive
integers and stereotype-incongruent responses were coded with
negative integers (i.e., for the science–gender item, coding was
either −2 to 2 or −3 to 3, with positive scores indicating
stronger science–male associations; while for the arts–gender
item, positive scores indicate stronger arts–female associations).
To facilitate comparison of scores across the 5- and 7-point
scales, scores were standardized within scale-type relative to a
score of zero (means for 5- and 7-point standardized scores for
science–male stereotype were 0.99 and 1.01, respectively, and
0.66 and 0.67, respectively, for the 5- and 7-point arts–female
stereotype).
Implicit Academic Gender Stereotypes
The IAT assesses the relative strengths of cognitive associations
and was administered according to the recommendations of
Nosek et al. (2005). The gender–science IAT required quickly
sorting words into one of four designated categories—Female,
Male, Liberal Arts, or Science—using two computer keys.
Training established the proper category for four corresponding
sets of words: for example, Woman, Mother and Wife with
“Female”; Man, Father andHusband with “Male”; Arts, Literature
and Philosophy with “Liberal Arts”; and Biology, Chemistry
and Physics with “Science” (complete list can be seen in
the Supplementary Materials). Each participant sorted under
two conditions: (1) stereotype-congruent, in which science
and male words were sorted with one key, liberal arts and
female words with the other; and (2) stereotype-incongruent,
in which science and female words were sorted with one
key, liberal arts and male words with the other. The order
of the conditions was randomized. Faster correct sorting in
the stereotype-congruent condition than in the stereotype-
incongruent condition indicates greater strength of science–male
(and liberal arts–female) associations relative to science–female
(and liberal arts–male) associations. Data were cleaned according
to guidelines recommended by Nosek et al. (2005) and used by
Nosek et al. (2009) to guard against careless responding. These
procedures resulted in disqualification of IAT data for 11% of
respondents (see Supplementary Materials for details). An IAT D
score was computed for each participant by taking the difference
inmean response latency between the conditions and scaling it by
the overall variation (SD) of the participant’s response latencies
(Greenwald et al., 2003). Raw D scores were then standardized
for the entire sample relative to a score of zero, thus allowing
standard-deviation-unit comparisons with the explicit stereotype
scores. For the sake of simplicity we refer to this measure as the
“gender–science” IAT and say, for example, that positive scores
indicate science–male stereotyping. However, it is important to
note that arts–female associations are an integral, inseparable
component of this IAT (Nosek et al., 2005).
Procedure
Upon entering the online Project Implicit Demonstration portal,
participants were presented, in randomized order, with a list
of topics from which to choose. Those who selected “Gender–
Science,” were presented with three study components in
randomized order: (1) a questionnaire about academic attitudes,
goals and stereotypes, (2) the gender–science IAT, and (3) a brief
demographic questionnaire.
Results
Given the large sample sizes, even very small differences between
means are significant at p < 0.0001. Therefore, we focus our
reporting on the effect sizes, mostly Cohen’s ds, and the reader
can assume that if p-values are not given, they are less than
0.0001. Following Halpern et al.’s (2007) report on sex differences
in science and math, we use the term sex when distinguishing
men’s and women’s cognitions. To facilitate comparability, both
implicit (Istd) and explicit (Estd) stereotype scores are expressed
in standard deviation units relative to a zero, or no bias, score.
There are two sets of analyses for each of our hypotheses, one with
participants grouped by academic major, and another focused on
those reporting scientific professions. Descriptive statistics are
listed in Table 1 and all data and materials are available at the
Open Science Framework (https://osf.io/y7a3n).
Hypothesis 1a: Implicit Stereotype
Differences between Female and Male
Scientists
Women who are strongly identified with science will have relatively
weak implicit stereotypes, while men who are strongly science-
identified will have relatively strong ones.
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TABLE 1 | Descriptive statistics for stereotypes and importance of scientific knowledge by sex and academic major of highest degree.
Gender stereotypes, M (SD) Goal: science knowledge
N N-pct I-std E-Scistd E-Artstd N M (SD) Extreme%
WOMEN
Visual or performing arts 4348 3.5 1.23 (0.88) 0.98 (0.94) 0.55 (0.96) 1662 2.44 (1.01) 15
Humanities/liberal arts 12,522 10.1 1.28 (0.91) 1.07 (0.97) 0.71 (1.02) 4549 2.48 (0.97) 16
Law or legal studies 4694 3.8 0.99 (0.96) 0.98 (1.01) 0.70 (1.02) 1654 2.52 (0.98) 17
Communications 4495 3.6 1.28 (0.89) 1.12 (0.97) 0.89 (1.03) 1665 2.30 (0.99) 11
Education 16,808 13.5 1.05 (0.95) 1.00 (0.99) 0.80 (1.02) 6519 2.62 (0.95) 19
Social sciences or history 8760 7.0 1.15 (0.93) 1.03 (0.97) 0.72 (1.01) 3332 2.55 (0.95) 16
Business 12,520 10.1 0.99 (0.92) 1.03 (1.03) 0.81 (1.04) 4878 2.43 (0.98) 13
Psychology 20,547 16.5 1.05 (0.94) 0.95 (0.96) 0.82 (0.99) 8414 2.73 (0.92) 21
Health or related sciences 14,403 11.6 0.73 (0.98) 0.72 (1.01) 0.68 (0.99) 6337 3.22 (0.80) 42
Computer and info sciences 2607 2.1 0.74 (0.99) 0.98 (1.01) 0.65 (0.99) 919 3.01 (0.90) 34
Bio/life sciences 12,755 10.2 0.35 (1.02) 0.58 (0.95) 0.56 (0.91) 5558 3.61 (0.59) 66
Engin, math, phys sciences 10,020 8.0 0.39 (1.03) 0.88 (0.97) 0.61 (0.92) 4269 3.46 (0.71) 57
All 124,479 0.92 (1.00) 0.92 (0.99) 0.72 (1.00) 49,756 2.85 (0.98) 30
MEN
Visual or performing arts 1954 3.7 0.65 (0.99) 0.98 (0.98) 0.19 (0.88) 635 2.59 (0.95) 17
Humanities/liberal arts 5254 10.0 0.64 (1.03) 1.06 (1.00) 0.24 (0.90) 1837 2.53 (0.97) 17
Law or legal studies 2440 4.7 0.80 (1.01) 1.17 (1.04) 0.45 (1.02) 976 2.56 (0.96) 17
Communications 1522 2.9 0.67 (1.00) 1.06 (1.02) 0.38 (0.97) 551 2.40 (0.99) 13
Education 3179 6.1 0.83 (1.00) 1.06 (0.99) 0.52 (1.00) 1254 2.67 (0.95) 20
Social sciences or history 3393 6.5 0.73 (1.00) 1.11 (0.99) 0.34 (0.97) 1251 2.65 (0.95 20
Business 7853 15.0 1.00 (0.95) 1.25 (1.00) 0.71 (1.07) 3102 2.57 (0.92) 15
Psychology 4779 9.1 0.91 (0.99) 1.08 (0.96) 0.50 (0.97) 1888 2.83 (0.92) 26
Health or related sciences 2899 5.5 1.12 (0.94) 1.14 (0.98) 0.63 (1.01) 1282 3.28 (0.77) 45
Computer and info sciences 4257 8.1 1.09 (0.94) 1.32 (0.99) 0.62 (0.99) 1480 3.09 (0.81) 33
Bio/life sciences 4433 8.5 1.18 (0.95) 1.07 (0.95) 0.56 (0.96) 1834 3.53 (0.63) 60
Engin, math, phys sciences 10,493 20.0 1.21 (0.96) 1.39 (0.96) 0.64 (0.97) 4083 3.39 (0.73) 51
All 52,456 0.97 (0.99) 1.19 (0.99) 0.53 (0.99) 20,173 2.93 (0.94) 32
Categories of majors are ordered, top to bottom, from lowest to highest science-content ratings made by psychology graduate students blind to our study hypotheses. Stereotype
scores (suffix std) are standardized across the full sample relative to a score of zero. Stereotype labels: I, Implicit science-male; E-Sci, Explicit science-male; E-Art, Explicit arts-female.
Response scale for the “Goal: Science Knowledge” variable was Not at all important, Slightly important, Moderately important, Very important, and Extremely important, and is coded
0–4. Extreme% indicates the percentage of respondents choosing Extremely important.
Identification by Academic Major
Averaged across the entire sample, implicit science–male
stereotyping was strong, nearly a full standard deviation above
zero, Istd = 0.93. Overall, participant sex made a trivial
difference, men averaging higher by just 0.05 standard deviations
(i.e., Cohen’s d = 0.05). However, as predicted, substantial
sex differences were observed when participants were grouped
by their academic major (Figure 2A), the direction of the
difference varying systematically with rankings of the majors’
degree of science content. The largest differences between men
and women (ds ∼ 0.8) came in the fields rated highest in
scientific content (biological and physical sciences), where men’s
stereotyping was the strongest among all men and women’s
was the weakest among all women. This pattern conforms to
Greenwald et al.’s (2002) cognitive consistency principles. That is,
the strongest science–male (liberal arts–female) stereotypes are
observed among those whose sex is aligned with their major in
a stereotype-congruent fashion (e.g., among women identified
with strongly non-STEM majors like arts and humanities, and
among men identified with STEM majors), while the weakest
stereotypes are seen among those with stereotype-incongruent
combinations (men in arts and women in STEM). This pattern
makes clear that this implicit stereotype is not simply a socially-
shared association acquired through cultural exposure. Rather,
it reveals important dependencies with combinations of gender
identity and science/arts identities.
While women in STEM have the weakest science–male
stereotypes, suggesting an important relation with their scientific
identity, it is notable that they do not evidence a counter-
stereotypical implicit association. On average, women majoring
in STEM of any kind (the four right-most groups of majors in
Figure 2A) still implicitly stereotyped science as male by half
a standard deviation above the zero-point of no stereotyping
(Istd = 0.53), and even those in the two categories of majors with
the lowest average stereotypes, biological and physical sciences,
still evidenced stereotypes of at least a third of a standard
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FIGURE 5 | (A,B) Boxplots of stereotype scores by sex and science profession for participants age 26 and older. Box width is proportional to subgroup n and
notches indicate standard errors around the median. d scores are standardized sex effects, male mean minus female mean, within each profession/degree category.
deviation in the science-is-male direction, Istd 0.33 and 0.39,
respectively.
Identification by Scientific Profession
When participants are classified by scientific profession (see
Figure 5A), we find the same general sex-effect pattern that
was observed within academic major classifications—stronger
stereotyping by men than women (this is not the case among
social scientists, shown only for comparison, who stereotyped
at a robust level but without sex differences). Male physicians,
life scientists, physical scientists, and engineers all evidence
much stronger levels of implicit science–male stereotype than the
women in these professions, with a median sex-difference effect
size of d of 0.89. Indeed, the smallest d, 0.52 for the physicians,
is something of an outlier, with the next smallest effect being
d = 0.81. The smaller sex effect for the physicians is driven by the
relatively stronger average stereotype evidenced by the women,
which is higher than that of the next highest female group in
Figure 5A—engineers with bachelor’s degrees—by a d of 0.29.
Hypothesis 1b: Explicit Stereotype
Differences between Female and Male
Scientists
Women who are strongly identified with science will have
relatively weak explicit science-is-male stereotypes, while men who
are strongly science-identified will have relatively strong ones.
Conscious motivations to respond in accord with both personally-
and societally-endorsed values, however, are expected to constrain
the magnitude of effects relative to those for the implicit stereotype.
Identification by Academic Major
Responses to the two explicit stereotype measures, science–
gender and arts–gender, are shown as a function of major in
Figures 2B,C. As was the case for implicit stereotypes, overall
means averaged strongly in stereotypical directions (science–
male and arts–female), though associations of science with male
were stronger than those of arts with female, Estd = 1.01 and
0.66, respectively. Sixty-three percent of participants reported
associating science at least “slightly” with male, compared with
46% who associated arts at least “slightly” with female. Science–
male and arts–female ratings were not highly correlated (r =
0.28).
Unlike for implicit stereotyping, there were overall sex
differences in explicit stereotyping, with men more likely than
women to associate science with male (70 vs. 60%), and women
more likely than men to associate arts with female (49 vs. 41%).
As noticeable in Figures 2B,C, these sex differences are driven by
participants in the corresponding STEM and non-STEM majors,
respectively. That is, the sex difference in science stereotyping
is primarily among STEM majors and the sex difference in
arts stereotyping is among non-STEM majors. Supporting our
hypothesis, the sex differences in explicit science stereotyping
were largest among the STEM majors, men stereotyping more
strongly than women (ds ranging 0.35–0.52), but smaller than
the sex differences observed for implicit stereotyping. The
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sex difference in arts stereotyping, however (Figure 2C), owed
virtually nothing to STEM majors (a d of 0.06 is the largest sex
difference in any of the STEM fields). It came primarily, instead,
from those in the eight non-STEM fields (median d = 0.35),
women stereotyping more than men.
Identification by Scientific Profession
The same, expected pattern of stronger stereotyping by men
in STEM was also observed for the explicit gender stereotypes
of science professionals aged 26 and older (see Figure 5B).
Male physicians, biological and physical scientists, and engineers
(N = 1923) averaged Estd = 1.23, SD = 0.99, while
women in these fields (N = 2670) averaged Estd = 0.82,
SD = 0.98, for a d = 0.41. The magnitude of the sex
difference in explicit stereotyping is, again, less than for implicit
stereotyping.
Hypothesis 2a: Implicit Stereotype
Differences as a Function of Gender Ratios
in Science Environments
Implicit science-is-male stereotypes will be stronger for both women
and men in low-female STEM fields than in high-female fields,
though sex differences should remain.
Identification by Academic Major
The primary question of our study is whether science-is-male
stereotypes vary as a function of gender ratio differences across
scientific disciplines. First, it is apparent from Figure 2A that
variation in average implicit stereotyping across the four science
domains (at right) is greater for women than for men.Within-sex
analysis of variance (ANOVA) modeling for participants in these
domains yielded an extremely small effect of scientific category
for men, R2 = 0.003, F(3, 22078) = 20.9 (Istd = 1.17, SD =
0.95), but a larger one for women, R2 = 0.031, F(3, 39781) =
421.6 (Istd = 0.52, SD = 1.02). The noticeable stereotyping
difference for women does not align with differences in gender
ratios across the scientific disciplines. If stereotypes covaried
with gender ratios, we would expect differences in the strength
of stereotypes evidenced by women in the health vs. computer
science fields (which are high- and low-female, respectively) and
in biological vs. physical sciences (also high- and low-female).
We find, however, that the stereotype strengths for each of these
comparisons differ very little, F(1, 17008) = 0.2, p = 0.68, for
health vs. computer science, and F(1, 22773) = 7.4, p = 0.007,
d = 0.037, for biological vs. physical sciences. The noticeable
difference falls, instead, between health and computer sciences
combined, on one hand (average Istd = 0.73, SD = 0.98), and
biological and physical sciences combined on the other (average
Istd = 0.37, SD = 1.03). The implicit stereotyping difference
between these two combinations was more than a third of a
standard deviation, d = 0.37, R2 = 0.031, F(1, 39783) = 1257.
These patterns do not support our hypothesis that strength
of implicit stereotyping among those in science domains
will vary with gender ratios. Rather, the noticeable difference
for women tracked with differences in scientific values as
indicated by their ratings of the personal importance of
scientific knowledge. Those with the weakest stereotypes—
the women in biological and physical sciences—assigned the
greatest importance to the personal goal of being knowledgeable
in science. As seen in Table 1, 66% of biological sciences
women and 57% of physical sciences women rated knowledge
of science as an extremely important personal goal, compared
with only 42 and 34%, respectively, of women with health
and computer sciences majors. Following Baron and Kenny’s
recommended steps (Baron and Kenny, 1986; Kenny, 2014),
we used three regression models to evaluate the science-
knowledge-importance variable as a potential mediator of the
difference in implicit stereotyping between biological/physical
sciences women and health/computer sciences women. Model
1 estimated the bivariate regression between group membership
(X, dummy-coded 0 for health/computer science majors and 1
for biological/physical science majors) and implicit stereotyping
(Y); Model 2 estimated the bivariate regression between X and
the proposed mediator (M, the science-knowledge-importance
variable, coded 0–4); and Model 3 estimated the multiple
regression of implicit stereotyping on both X and M. The
baseline effect (Model 1) of X (being a biological/physical
science major) on implicit stereotyping was estimated as b =
−0.36, model R2 = 0.031. Model 2 demonstrated that
type of science field (X) predicts science-knowledge-importance
score (M), b = 0.35, model R2 = 0.054. When both
X andM were included in the multiple regression Model 3,
the effect of being a biological/physical science major was
reduced to b = −0.29, a reduction of about one-fifth
compared to the estimate from Model 1, and model R2
nearly doubled to 0.057. Thus, an indicator of the strength of
personal scientific values provided some traction in accounting
for stereotyping differences among women in the different
science groups.
Identification by Scientific Profession
Since the sex effects (Hypothesis 1a; Figure 5A) were fairly
uniformly large and not our critical question, we fit separate
within-sex bivariate regression models to estimate gender-ratio
effects. First, as previously noted, female physicians had stronger
implicit stereotypes than women in any other STEM professional
group. This is incongruent with the gender-ratios hypothesis
that predicts weaker stereotyping among physicians, relative to
physical scientists or engineers, given the relatively high-female
ratio in medicine.
Among the remaining types of scientists, we estimated gender-
ratio effects by contrasting the implicit stereotypes of life
scientists (coded 0), where high-female ratios are more likely,
with those of physical scientists and engineers (coded 1), where
low-female ratios are more likely. Results of regression analyses
predicting implicit stereotyping from this contrast of disciplines
were non-significant for both women and men (for women, b =
0.000, t = −0.01, p = 0.99, R2 = 0.000; for men, b = 0.135,
t = 2.67, p = 0.008, R2 = 0.004). Thus, our gender-ratio
hypothesis for implicit stereotyping is not supported when tested
among professional scientists.
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Hypothesis 2b: Explicit Stereotype
Differences as a Function of Gender Ratios
in Science Environments
Explicit science-is-male stereotypes will be stronger for both women
and men in low-female STEM fields than in high-female fields,
though, again, group variation on explicit stereotype means should
be somewhat constrained by conscious values and motivations to
respond without bias.
Identification by Academic Major
Unlike for implicit stereotyping, patterns of explicit science–
male stereotyping conformed to our gender-ratio hypothesis
(see Figure 2B). For both men and women in sciences, the
weakest explicit stereotypes were in the domains where women
are more strongly represented, i.e., in health and biological
sciences, and the strongest were seen where women are least
represented, in computer and physical sciences. Notably, for
scientificmenwho are in high-female fields (health and biological
sciences) stereotype levels are rather generic, i.e., similar to those
among the non-STEM men and women. For such men, while
their identity (“I’m scientific and I’m male”) maps onto the
stereotype, their environment, on average, belies the stereotype
(not clearly male-majority). It is only the men in majority-
male environments, computer and physical sciences, who deviate
(upward) from the generic level of stereotyping. For scientific
women, the generic level is seen for those in the low-female fields,
where, again, there is mismatch between their identity and the
stereotype manifested in gender-ratios. In their case, however,
personal identities, scientific and female, belie the stereotype
and the environment supports it. The women whose stereotypes
deviate (downward) from the generic tend to be in the high-
female fields in which gender ratios complement their identities
in undermining the stereotypical propositions they may consider
when explicitly reporting gender–science associations.
Identification by Scientific Profession
The explicit stereotypes of scientific professionals were also
congruent with the gender-ratio predictions of hypothesis
2b. Physical scientists and engineers, together, had stronger
stereotypes than life scientists, d effect sizes of 0.37 for women
and 0.52 for men (the estimated stereotyping effect of being a
physical scientist or engineer was b = 0.35, t = 9.64, p < 0.0001,
R2 = 0.032 for women; b = 0.50, t = 9.81, p < 0.0001,
R2 = 0.047, for men).
Since physicians’ explicit science–male stereotypes did not
obviously differ from those of the other STEM scientists, as
female physicians’ did for implicit stereotype, we included
physicians in another set of regression analyses with PhD-level
participants in the other STEM domains. That is, we contrasted
physicians/life scientists at the MD or PhD-level (coded 0) with
physical scientists/engineers at the PhD-level (coded 1). We
relaxed alpha to 0.01 because of the smaller cell sizes (e.g.,
N = 350 male physical scientists/engineers with PhDs). Effects
again supported our gender-ratio hypotheses, albeit less strongly
among these MD/PhDs (for women, b = 0.30, t = 5.26, p <
0.0001, R2 = 0.022; for men, b = 0.20, t = 3.09, p = 0.0021,
R2 = 0.011).
Thus, unlike results for the implicit stereotype, the patterns
of explicit science-is-male stereotypes generally conform to our
gender ratios hypothesis (2b) for STEM professionals. Physicians
and life scientists, who are more likely to work in high-
female ratio environments, explicitly stereotype science as male
less strongly than do engineers and physical scientists, who
are more likely to find themselves in low-female ratio work
settings.
Hypothesis 3a: Implicit Stereotype
Differences as a Function of “Dosage” of
Exposure to Given Gender-Ratios
Implicit science-is-male stereotyping should increase with
prolonged exposure to low-female STEM environments
and decrease with ongoing exposure to high-female STEM
environments.
Identification by Academic Major
Women’s means are plotted in Figure 3A for each year of
age, 18–22, across all 12 academic categories. If length of
exposure to collegiate science environments with skewed gender
ratios has an effect on implicit stereotypes, then in the low-
female computer and physical science domains we should see
stereotype-strengthening across these ages, and weakening in the
high-female health and biological science domains. We tested
these expectations with ANOVAs contrasting stereotype means
across the five age groups for each sex within each of our four
categories of STEM majors. Given the smaller cell sizes in these
models for the effect of age within sex-by-major groups (the
smallest being the samples for women in computer science,
ranging from N = 30–74), alpha for significance testing was
reduced to 0.01.
Each of the ANOVA models for women was non-significant,
bearing out the impression of stability suggested by the
overlapping standard error bars around these means in
Figure 3A3. Thus, for women in STEM fields, there was not
statistically significant variation in implicit science stereotyping
across groups spanning the traditional age range of college study.
For men, age effects were non-significant for all but one
domain, biological science, R2 = 0.02, F(4, 1152) = 6.23, p <
0.0001 (Istd = 1.23, SD = 0.90). The pattern among the men
in biology was of increasing stereotype strength (see Figure 3B),
despite the majority proportion of women among biology majors
nationally. Eighteen-year-old men in biology averaged Istd =
1.13 (SD = 0.89), compared with Istd = 1.48 (SD = 0.84) for
the 22-year-olds, an effect of d = 0.31. Thus, a lack of difference
across years of age was the dominant finding for women and
men, and the one instance of significant age effect is in a direction
opposite to the gender-ratio dosage hypothesis.
3To insure that results were not affected by extreme observations, models were also
run without the lowest and highest 1% of IAT scores within ageXgenderXmajor
categories. ANOVA result patterns were unchanged under these conditions.
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Identification by Scientific Profession
To test whether implicit stereotyping varies with increasing
duration and intensity of training, indexed by degree level, we
estimated regression models using scientist-type (life scientist,
coded 0, vs. physical scientist/engineer, coded 1) and degree-level
(bachelor’s, master’s, or PhD) as predictors. Alpha was set at 0.05
because of the relatively small numbers in some categories, e.g.,
N = 68 for male physical scientists with a bachelor’s degree. Two
orthogonal contrast codes were used to index degree-level effects,
code-1 for Masters vs. PhD and code-2 for Bachelors vs. Masters
and PhD, together. Because degree-level is confounded with age,
age was included as a covariate in all models (and yielded a
positive main effect, but no interactions, for both sexes).
No effects of degree-level were found for men, but for women
a significant interaction was observed between scientist-type and
Masters- vs. PhD-level degrees, t = −2.58, p = 0.01. Implicit
stereotyping strengthened with higher degrees among the life
scientist women, but weakened with higher degrees among
physical scientists and engineers, a pattern precisely opposite to
our hypothesis (3a) that greater tenure in a field would correlate
with stronger or weaker implicit stereotype depending on female-
male ratios. Specifically, among female life scientists, implicit
stereotypes were Istd = 0.25 (SD = 0.97) at theMasters level and
Istd = 0.37 (SD = 0.99) at the PhD level, compared with those
of female physical scientists and engineers that were Istd = 0.31
(SD = 1.02) at the Masters level and Istd = 0.19 (SD = 1.05)
at the PhD level. We hypothesized the opposite, that weaker
stereotyping would occur with higher degree-attainment in the
relatively high-female life sciences, and stronger stereotyping
would occur with higher degree-level in the low-female physical
and engineering sciences.
Hypothesis 3b: Explicit Stereotype
Differences as a Function of “Dosage” of
Exposure to given Gender-Ratios
Explicit stereotypes, when measured for scientists in a given field
with roughly constant gender-ratio, will not be systematically
responsive to dosage because the general propositions being weighed
may not change (systematically) very much.
Identification by Academic Major
Figures 4A,B show plots for women and men, respectively, of
explicit science–male stereotype means for each age across the
academic major categories. The only instance of age differences
in stereotyping at the 0.01 alpha level was a very small effect for
men in physical sciences, R2 = 0.007, F(4, 2211) = 3.76, p = 0.005
(Estd = 1.46, SD = 0.90). The peculiarity of this finding, the one
significant test out of eight, warrants circumspection. Overall, the
lack of variation in explicit stereotyping among STEM majors
across the college years, supports our hypothesis of no systematic
change for either men or women when the gender ratio of the
given field is assumed constant.
Identification by Scientific Profession
Using the same regression estimation approach as was described
for the implicit stereotype analysis (contrast-coded predictors
of scientist-type, life scientist vs. physical scientist/engineer, and
degree-level, alpha 0.05), we found no dosage effect of degree
level for explicit science–male stereotype among women, and a
significant, but unpredicted interactive pattern for men similar to
that observed for the implicit stereotyping of women, t = −2.11,
p = 0.035. Among male life scientists, explicit stereotypes were
stronger at the PhD level (Istd = 0.95, SD = 0.94) than at the
Masters level (Istd = 0.75, SD = 0.95), but the opposite held
for male physical scientists and engineers, who were weaker at
the PhD level (Istd = 1.25, SD = 1.00) than at the Masters level
(Istd = 1.41, SD = 0.96). This pattern supports our hypothesis
that evidence of systematic change of explicit stereotyping was
not expected within environments of particular gender ratios.
Discussion
With a sample of 176,935, including thousands of engineers,
physicians and scientists, we examined science-is-male
stereotypic associations as a function of sex, scientific identity,
and gender ratios in scientific disciplines. Stereotyping science
as male was normative, implicitly and explicitly, as both types
of scores averaged roughly a standard deviation above the
zero-level of stereotyping on the respective scales. However,
both types were marked by considerable variation depending on
sex and academic or career identity, demonstrating that these
gender associations are not simple reflections of a common
cultural stereotype in the air. As expected, consistent with a
well-established literature, we observed a positive relationship
between stereotyping and science identity for men and a negative
relationship for women. Men in STEM evidenced stronger
science-is-male stereotypes than their non-STEM brethren,
especially implicitly, while women in STEM evidenced the
opposite pattern, much weaker implicit stereotyping than non-
STEM women. As a result, in biological and physical sciences
and engineering (the categories of science majors in our study
that were rated as most scientific), the sex difference in implicit
stereotyping was large, more than 0.8 standard deviations,
ranking among the largest sex differences seen in cognitive
research (Miller and Halpern, 2014).
Our primary question, however, was whether strength of
science–male stereotyping would vary across scientific disciplines
as a function of gender ratios in the disciplines. This hypothesis
was supported for explicit stereotypes, but not for implicit
ones. As expected, relatively stronger explicit stereotypes were
evidenced by scientists studying and practicing in fields where
women continue to be distinct minorities, and weaker ones
were expressed by scientists in fields where women are better
represented. Implicit stereotyping differences between scientists
in different disciplines, however, did not correspond with
gender ratios. For men there was little variation in implicit
stereotype strength across four classifications of academic science
concentration. Women, in contrast, evidenced considerable
variation across these classifications, but it did not coincide with
gender ratio differences. Rather, it coincided with differences
in an indicator of the women’s scientific identity. Specifically,
implicit stereotyping varied with the value the women assigned to
being personally knowledgeable about science.Women reporting
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that personal knowledge of science was “extremely important”
had weaker implicit stereotypes than women reporting less
personal priority on scientific knowledge. Though biological
and physical science fields vary greatly in typical gender ratios,
women in these disciplines were similar in the degree to
which they placed extreme importance on personal scientific
knowledge and in having the weakest implicit stereotypes of
all women, whereas women in computer and health sciences,
disciplines that also differ markedly in gender ratio, placed
less importance on scientific knowledge and stereotyped more
strongly. We found, furthermore, little evidence of difference
in implicit stereotype strength corresponding to “dosage” of
exposure to particular gender ratios. That is, within a particular
field of whatever typical gender ratio, greater duration and
intensity of exposure (whether operationalized by the cross-
sectional proxy of traditional college ages from 18 to 22, or by
levels of training among practicing scientists, BA, MA, or PhD)
did not correspond to different implicit stereotype strengths
as expected.
Why Didn’t the Implicit Science–male
Stereotype Vary with Gender Ratio
Differences in Science Fields?
While our analyses make clear that implicit gender–science
stereotype strength varies greatly, primarily for women, across
different scientific disciplines, gender ratios were not found to
be a factor. How can this be if implicit stereotypes are sensitive
to environmental inputs (Gawronski and Bodenhausen, 2006;
Ratliff and Nosek, 2010; Miller et al., in press)? The answer
may lie in Greenwald et al.’s (2002) assertion that the self is
the power-center of automatic associative processes. Once strong
self-concept bonds are formed (e.g., me-woman; me-science), the
resulting, secondary, stereotypical associations (women-science)
may be fairly impervious to local environmental conditions,
like a preponderance of men in the lab, that would otherwise
change them. Miller et al.’s (in press) country-level analysis
identified precisely the relation between collegiate science
gender-ratios and implicit stereotyping that we expected—
but that we did not find—at a scientific discipline-level of
analysis, i.e., higher female proportions in science associated
with lower science-is-male stereotypes. We suspect that the
apparent incongruence between their finding and ours hinges on
scientific self-concept. That is, their analysis took into account
respondents’ country of citizenship and gender, but did not
distinguish between levels of personal scientific identification,
while ours controlled for self-reported academic major and
priority on personal scientific knowledge. Our finding leads us
to expect that the implicit stereotypes held by strongly science-
identified women, like majors or scientists in biological or
physical sciences, will be similar across countries, regardless of
country proportion of women in collegiate science. That is, we
would now expect science identity to trump the influence of
local conditions.
Ratliff and Nosek (2010) note that, while implicit associative
processes do a good job of accounting for covariation
of events in the environment—like female proportions in
science settings—they are also influenced by the frequency
of association activations. Thus, if self-associations enjoy a
leverage advantage in cognitive evaluative networks to begin
with, as postulated by Greenwald et al. (2002), and self-
associations also are more frequently activated than more
abstract group-associations, then once a strong positive implicit
science-self association is established (me-science), it may
overpower potentially conflicting science-gender associations
conveyed by the environment. We did not measure implicit
science-self associations, but research indicates that they
are strongly positively correlated with explicit indicators of
science identity and favorability like ones we measured (Nosek
and Smyth, 2011). Dasgupta’s (2011) stereotype inoculation
model hinges on developing a strong implicit STEM self-
concept as a protection against pervasive cultural stereotypes
and the vagaries of local conditions. Our data suggest
that women in the most scientifically demanding fields,
regardless of gender-ratios, are anchored at low levels of
implicit stereotyping by their weighty scientific self-concepts
and values.
Our “dosage” inference—that women’s implicit stereotyping,
within any particular academic major, is largely stable from age
18 on and across increasing levels of training and professional
attainment—suggests that women’s implicit stereotypes about
gender and science may be fairly stable once strong scientific self-
concepts are established. These cross-sectional data, however,
can only be suggestive. Longitudinal research across the adult
age range we studied is necessary for confidence in this pattern.
Yet even if stability of adult implicit science associations was
well-established, a more pressing longitudinal question would
remain: How do children’s and adolescents’ implicit scientific
associations develop and to what extent do they influence
consequential STEM behaviors and choices? Galdi et al.’s (2014)
demonstration that brief exposure to a stereotypical gender–math
image vs. a counter-stereotypical one influenced both the implicit
gender-math stereotyping and math performance of six-year-
old girls should be a clarion call to such research. Longitudinal
data on the development of implicit scientific self-concepts
and stereotypes would help shed light on our “self-as-power-
center” explanation for later stereotyping differences across
scientific disciplines.
Based on their cross-sectional findings with elementary school
students, that implicit math–gender stereotypes were already
in force and were stronger than implicit math self-concepts,
Cvencek et al. (2011) speculate that the implicit stereotype
precedes, and may influence formation of, the implicit self-
concept. It may be that stereotypes influence the early formation
of self-concepts, but that once self-concepts are strong they
are no longer easily influenced by stereotypes or stereotypical
environmental conditions. Whatever the early trajectory and
leading causal influences, Tai et al. (2006) found that by
eighth grade, scientific goals—explicit values—were predictive of
earning science degrees, especially in the physical sciences and
engineering. It is time to add understanding of how implicit
science stereotypes and self-concepts relate to such critical
formative trajectories.
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Why Did the Explicit Science–male
Stereotype Vary with Gender Ratio
Differences in Science Fields?
According to Gawronski and Bodenhausen (2006), explicit
associations are an amalgam of both automatic, associative
processes, and controlled, propositional processes. The latter can
be applied in deliberate attempts to adjust responses for the
“truth-value” of evaluations or stereotypes. So in formulating
their responses to the questionnaire item, “Please rate how
much you associate science with males or females,” participants
were able to exercise choice about how to weight possibly
varying components of this association. A female physicist
may have thought, for example, “Well, I love physics and am
highly accomplished in the field, but I think this question
is less about my personal experience and more about what
I see as gender proportions in science, generally.” If most
of her physics colleagues are male, such an interpretation of
the question might have led her to select the “strongly male”
gender-science association answer. Conversely, a female biology
professor might have reasoned, “Most of my undergraduate
students are female, and now a third of my faculty colleagues
are female—with even higher proportions of women among the
young stars—so I’ll pick the ‘neither male nor female’ answer.”
Though each of these hypothetical women would explicitly
report a strong self-identification with science, their reports
of gender associations with science can be made relatively
independently of their self-concept. Our data suggest, however,
that their implicit gender–science associations are a function
of their self-associations with science, resulting in similarly
weak implicit science–male stereotypes regardless of the different
truth-values the gender ratios of their environments might
have suggested.
Limitations
Though the sample is large and there is more age and
occupational variation than found in most studies of
STEM stereotypes, it is not representative of any definable
population. Participants are self-selected volunteers and their
responses have no experimenter oversight. Generalizability
to highly STEM-identified people is suggested, however, by
our findings of comparable patterns of implicit stereotype
strength and gender differences for University of Virginia
undergraduates in engineering and advanced mathematics
courses (Smyth unpublished manuscript; Martin et al., 2013;
Smyth unpublished data). These students were not self-
selected (their participation was a course requirement), yet
the sex differences found in their stereotyping were similar in
magnitude to those of the STEM-identified participants in the
current study.
One reviewer expressed concern that the different methods
of defining “Science” in our explicit and implicit stereotype
instruments posed a potential confound for our results.
Specifically, it was argued that the explicit stereotype instrument,
asking participants to consider how strongly they associate
males or females with the general concept, “Science,” presents
an amorphous target that is likely to be interpreted through
the lens of respondents’ particular scientific discipline and
experience, and so is prone to a correspondence between
gender-ratios and the explicit stereotype. We agree with this
interpretation and predicted that respondents’ local experience
would, indeed, inform their rating of the stereotype strength.
“Science” in the Implicit Association Test, on the other hand, is
ostensibly defined by all of the exemplars that are sorted into
the category, including, for example, Biology and Chemistry,
both relatively high-female fields, and Engineering and Physics,
both low-female fields. Thus, the reviewer argues, the science
construct used in the implicit measurement is more clearly
defined as all-encompassing, and participants may be less likely
to frame it in light of their particular disciplinary experience.
We agree that this is possible, but believe that it is unlikely.
A measurement property of the IAT is that the category labels
dominate assessment over the exemplars (De Houwer, 2001;
Nosek et al., 2007). The IAT in this study used the category
labels “Science” and “Liberal Arts.” The individual exemplars
may only have a small effect in as much as they change the
construal of those category labels (Nosek et al., 2005). We
think it is likely, therefore, that this implicit measure, like
the explicit one, invokes a rather general science construct
that is also subject to framing by respondents’ particular
experiences. Even so, replication with other explicit and implicit
measurement techniques would be a useful check on this
question.
Another impetus for replication with a different implicit
science-is-male instrument is to avoid the IAT’s structural
requirement of a contrasting category, in this case, the fairly
distinct other academic stereotype of “gender–arts.” Our explicit
stereotype measurement approach, which allowed separate
measurement of gender–science and gender–arts stereotypes,
underscored their distinctiveness, especially for participants
identifying as STEM majors (see Results for Hypothesis 1
and Figures 2B,C). Further evidence from our study suggests,
however, that the science–gender construct may, indeed, be
driving performance on this IAT more than the arts–gender
construct. Among the STEM majors in our sample, explicit
science–gender stereotype was a better predictor of IAT score
than was the explicit arts–gender stereotype (regression R2 s of
0.063 and 0.013, respectively, and increasing only to 0.067 when
both factors and their interaction were included in a multiple
regression model).
Finally, our cross-sectional data require that inferences about
the lack of environmental “dosage” effects be held cautiously
until longitudinal studies are brought to bear. Of our two
proxies for dosage (1) gradations of experience across the five
years of traditional college age and (2) bachelors, masters and
doctoral levels of scientific achievement, we agree with one of
our reviewers that the latter is likely the more reliable. The
dominant finding of scant evidence for dosage effects with
either method, however, lends credence to the general conclusion
that ongoing exposure to particular gender ratios, once strong
scientific identities are established, may have little effect on
personally-held stereotypes.
Frontiers in Psychology | www.frontiersin.org 16 April 2015 | Volume 6 | Article 415
Smyth and Nosek Scientists’ gender–science stereotypes
Conclusion
Male scientists, on average, hold substantially stronger explicit
and implicit science-is-male stereotypes than do female scientists.
The gender difference is greatest, exceeding 0.8 standard
deviations, for the implicit stereotypes held by men and
women in either biological/life sciences or engineering/physical
sciences (about twice the size of the differences in health
and computer science fields). Average stereotype strengths
differ across scientific disciplines, but in different patterns for
explicit and implicit stereotypes. Differences in explicit stereotype
strength correspond to gender ratios. That is, lower proportions
of women in a field predict stronger explicit science-is-male
associations. Implicit stereotype differences, in contrast, do
not track with gender ratios. The implicit stereotyping levels
for female and male scientists in life sciences, for example,
where women are strongly represented, are similar to the levels
in physical sciences and engineering, where women remain
distinct minorities. Regardless of gender ratio, implicit stereotype
differences align with indicators of individuals’ scientific identity,
such that disciplines with higher proportions of extremely
science-identified people are characterized by more extreme
implicit stereotype averages, extremely high for men and
extremely low for women.
For scientifically-identified adults within a given discipline
(assuming a generally constant gender-ratio), neither explicit
nor implicit stereotype levels vary much as a function of cross-
sectional proxies for “dosage” of the exposure to that gender ratio.
That is, within disciplines, stereotype strengths are comparable
between newly-declared STEM majors at age 18, bachelors,
masters and PhD STEM degree-holders, and practicing scientists.
Though stereotype change was not measured, these cross-
sectional data suggest that, once a scientific identity is established,
implicit stereotype strength remains fairly constant at a low level
for women and at a high level for men, regardless of immediate
gender ratio or duration and intensity of training and practice.
They further suggest that neither sex differences in implicit
stereotyping, nor individual differences in implicit stereotyping,
are likely to account for women’s differential representation
across scientific disciplines once a major is declared.
This is not to suggest that adults’ STEM interest and pursuit is
not influenced by implicit stereotypes and self-concepts. There
is much to learn, for instance, about implicit influences for
the many who begin college without a clear major direction,
as well as for the substantial number who intend a major in
STEM at the start, but do not persist (Chang et al., 2014; Higher
Education Research Institute, 2014). Still, it makes sense that
research resources be focused at understanding the influences
on children’s self-concepts and stereotypes, as they are certainly
more malleable and there is still time for interventions to work
ahead of the coalescing of academic interests and goals during
adolescence (Tai et al., 2006; Galdi et al., 2014). As noted by Ceci
and Williams (2010), it is likely that a lion’s share of the STEM
sex difference derives from choices made prior to taking college
courses.
Dasgupta (2011) emphasizes critical periods for inoculating
girls’ and women’s implicit stereotype-incongruent self-concepts
through increased exposure to same-sex peers and experts in the
given domain. These critical inoculation periods are theorized
to include youth, when self-concepts are forming, and times of
academic or professional transition for adults, when decisions
about persisting may be influenced unconsciously by feelings
of belonging. Our finding that the implicit gender–science
stereotypes of adults in science, while quite variable, do not
depend on proportion of same-sex peers in the environment
suggests that adults’ implicit science self-concepts may also have
little to do with gender ratios. That is, if Greenwald et al.’s
(2002) balanced identity theory of implicit cognition is correct,
the pattern of stability we have found for implicit science-
is-male stereotypes should also hold for science self-concepts.
Women in science, whether first-year collegians with a STEM
major or PhD scientists, tend to have relatively weak implicit
science-is-male stereotypes and can be expected to have strong
implicit science self-concepts, regardless of gender proportions
in the environment. Long-term longitudinal research is still
lacking on these questions, but our results, combined with other
evidence about critical junctures in the STEM pipeline, suggest
that resources will likely be most fruitfully invested in studies
beginning with children.
Supplementary Material
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